Written evidence submitted by Cdr N D MacCartan-Ward (ISD0013)

The Need for Justification of Armed Services’ Weapon Systems: Fixed Wing Combat Aircraft.

This Submission is supported by:

              Dr. Anthony R Wells

Rear Admiral Sir Robert Woodard KCVO DL

Rear Admiral Bob Love OBE CB FREng

Rear Admiral Bruce Williams CBE

Commodore Michael Clapp CB

Captain John Hall CBE

Captain Graham Meredith

Captain Colin Hamilton

Captain Peter Hore

Lieutenant-Colonel Ewen Southby-Tailyour OBE RM

Commander David A Hobbs MBE

Commander Ed Featherstone

Commander Graham Edmonds

              Commander Mike Evans

Commander Paul Fisher

Lieutenant-Commander Lester May

Major David Jeremy

Richard Shuttleworth RN

How should existing and in-development defence capabilities be reviewed?

The Need for Justification of Armed Services’ Weapon Systems: Fixed Wing Combat Aircraft.

Executive Summary.

1. This Submission underlines the need for the detailed review and justification of military weapon systems in order to prevent large scale waste in Defence Budget expenditure.

2. Specifically and as an example of this need, it seeks to evaluate and justify (or otherwise) military investment in

a)      Land-based non-carrier-capable fixed wing aircraft, and,

b)      Carrier-capable fixed wing aircraft

since the 1966/7 Carrier decision. In doing so it underpins the strategic reality that effective global power projection in support of the National Interest is most economically achieved by carrier-borne air groups.

3. It summarises original costs and inflation-linked costs of various programs and compares these with the operational return/combat effectiveness realised for each aircraft group.

4. It reveals a disturbing imbalance of investment between land-based and carrier-capable fixed wing combat aircraft that does not reflect declared UK Strategic Policy now centred upon Strike Carrier utility and deterrence.

5. It suggests that lack of combat effectiveness and utility by land-based aircraft

a)      provides no justification for this imbalance,

b)      that associated costs have been a prime causative factor in the generation of the “Black Hole” in Defence spending

c)      that such investment has prevented adequate, threat-related expenditure on more flexible and rapidly deployable weapons platforms in support of Strategic Maritime Policy.

Introduction

6. This Submission provides a concise review of investment in military combat aircraft and measures their effectiveness in terms of operations worldwide.

7. Since 1967, major costs have been kept hidden from the public by the MoD, especially for Tornado, Nimrod and, now, Typhoon in-service modifications and support. After 2003, MoD refused to release costings on the grounds of 'commercial sensitivity'. This eventually led to severe criticism of the Typhoon Project costs by the Public Accounts Committee in 2011 who surmised that these were likely to rise to at least £55 Billion. Ongoing major Typhoon modification programs support that suggestion.

8. Original unit aircraft costs presented are drawn mainly from MoD records and the DPA.

9. Annex A Tables summarise original and inflation-linked costs of each listed program. Annex B summarises Aircraft Combat utility.

Origins of Investment Imbalance.

10. In the late 60’s, Ministers were persuaded fraudulently and without justification that global 24/7 air defence of our Fleet and maritime supply routes could be conducted effectively by land-based air and that aircraft carriers were not required.

11. The RAF filled MoD with many more staff officers than the other two Services enabling them to have overwhelming influence in Whitehall on all air matters.  

12. The RN had a higher ratio of its personnel deployed in the front line and was unable to follow suit (see graph below). As RAF influence increased exponentially, RN influence decreased markedly.

13. Questionable advice from land-based-air aficionados and Academics in Whitehall has been accepted despite true global military power and deterrence requiring a robust deployed presence under the sea, on the sea surface and in the air above the Fleet and maritime supply routes.

Scope.

14. This Submission does not address the cost of our new carriers and the joint F-35B program. Nor does it address the major cost of land-based airfields, establishments, logistic support and personnel structures needed to enable Expeditionary Air Wing deployments. The Inquiry may wish to address the cost-effectiveness of such operations, bearing in mind their lack of distant First Echelon global deployability, utility and flexibility.

Investment in Land-based Fixed Wing Combat Aircraft.

Tornado Multi-Role Combat Aircraft.

15. A desk officer in MoD/DNLP in the late 80’s considers that this Submission’s given Tornado costs might have been underestimated. “Tornado Project managers removed money from the front end of the program (development phase) to make it look better and then over the ensuing years spent many times more than the initial sum saved to modify the aircraft and its systems to get back to the original design specs – which they never achieved.”

Tornado F1/F3 – Air Defence Vehicle.

16. Costs.

a)                  Initial unit cost, 1979:               £42 million.

b)                  Estimated in life cost (147 aircraft):               £9 billion.

c)                   Estimate of in-service modifications:              £15 billion.

Total initial program cost:               £24 billion.

17. Modifications to the Tornado ADV were on-going from day one but failed to provide the required operational capability. Problems continued through the 90’s leaving the aircraft without an effective air-to-air weapon system. Despite this, MoD/Air repeatedly informed Parliament that the aircraft was fully operational.

Combat Operations.

18. The Tornado ADV has not been able to contribute in any significant way to combat/deterrence operations offshore. Its lack of a working weapon system left the United Kingdom completely vulnerable to Soviet air attack up until the end of the Cold War and beyond. During Desert Storm, it flew nugatory combat air patrol missions over the Gulf, well away from the theatre of active operations.

Tornado GR1/4 – Ground Attack and Reconnaissance.

19. Costs.

a)                  Initial unit cost, 1979:               £37 million.

b)                  Estimated initial in life cost (138 aircraft):               £8 billion.

c)                   Estimate of in-service modifications:              £15 billion.

Total program cost*:               £23 billion.

* Extending the life of the GR4 in Afghanistan cost the taxpayer a further £7.5 billion (NAO estimate) whereas keeping Harrier in service would have cost the taxpayer approximately £1.1 billion. This unnecessary additional cost could have paid for our two new carriers.

20. Designed for low-level nuclear interdiction of Soviet runways and other targets, the GR1/4 suffered from the collaborative demands of our European partners. It had limited range and manoeuvrability especially when carrying a war load – as did the ADV.

21. The GR1 was provided with a Runway Denial Weapon, the JP 233. The GR4 was provided with the dis-functional Storm Shadow cruise missile for the interdiction of hardened targets.

Combat Operations.

22. Although the GR1/4 has been deployed in small numbers for combat operations over Iraq, Bosnia, Libya, Afghanistan and Syria, its track record has been less than remarkable – predominately achieving the destruction of pick-up trucks, mud huts and small groups of Jihadi fighters.

23. In Iraq, Desert Storm, eight aircraft were lost in quick succession but a formal inquiry found that only one of these was due to enemy action. The majority of the losses resulted from unfamiliarity with the JP 233 delivery profile.

24. Tornado GR operations over Libya were conducted from UK, Italy and Cyprus with major tanker and logistic support at an estimated deployment cost of at least £1.4 billion. Effectiveness of ordnance delivered was limited. Storm Shadow deliveries suffered from misfires, guidance and warhead failures and were totally ineffective.

25. Similar non-cost-effective Tornado operations were conducted over Syria at an estimated cost of £4 billion for the first three years: roughly £1 million for each Jihadi reported killed.

26. In Afghanistan, Tornado GR4 was significantly less effective than RN Fighter Wing and RAF Harrier squadrons that preceded it.

JP 233 Runway Denial Weapon for Tornado GR1.

27. Development cost, 1979:                                                                       £10 billion.              .

Combat Operations.

28. Its disastrous deployment on the Tornado GR1 in Desert Storm led to its immediate withdrawal from service.

Storm Shadow cruise missile for Tornado GR4 and Typhoon.

29. The initial procurement decision (circa 2002) by the MoD/Air department (EC Deep Strike) was for 900 missiles at a cost of £810 million. This did not reflect combat utility or Strategic Policy. Costs of modifying Typhoon for Storm Shadow have not been released.

Combat Operations.

30. No proof of targets successfully interdicted by Storm Shadow in Iraq, Libya or elsewhere has been declared.

Nimrod AWACS.

31. This ill-considered project cost the taxpayer not less than:                            £5 billion.

Nimrod MRA/MPA.

32. Cost.

a)                  Initial unit cost:               Not Known.

b)                  Estimated in life cost:               £15 billion.

c)                   In-service modifications, 1997:              £3 billion.

Total program cost:               £18 billion.

Combat Operations.

33. Nimrod was significantly absent from the effective direct support of the Falklands War, 1982, and from all other conflicts engaged in since that time.

Typhoon - Eurofighter.

34. Cost.

a)                  Initial unit cost, Defence Procurement Agency (1998):               £92.2 million.

b)                  Initial estimated in life cost, (160 aircraft):               £22 billion.

c)                   Estimate of in-service modifications:              £25 billion.

Total non-inflation-linked cost:              £47 billion.

35. The exponential cost of the Typhoon program would appear to be the demonstrable cause of the “Black Hole in Defence Spending”.

36. In 2006, the order for 232 airframes was reduced to 160. Simultaneously, Saudi Arabia procured 72 aircraft at £72 million per airframe - £20 million less than the cost to the RAF: representing a subsidy to Saudi Arabia of £1.44 billon – at tax-payers’ expense.

37. The Typhoon, with an unrefuelled combat radius of action of just 750 nm, is unable to defend the UK Base against the modern Russian air threat. Each Russian long-range bomber can launch up to 16 supersonic, conventional or nuclear armed cruise missiles[1] at 1300 nm from their targets.  UK does not have enough Air Refuelling resources to extend the combat range of the Typhoon on a 24/7 on-task basis at sufficient strength to deter/oppose this threat.  Only carrier air power coupled with Type 45 Daring Destroyer missiles have this capability.

38. Demonstrably, the land-based Typhoon has little or no utility in the context of our global maritime defensive strategy.

39. Despite this, Ministers have sanctioned modifications to give it an air-to-ground capability: leaving only about 30 available for front line operations[2]. £ billions worth of aircraft are sitting unserviceable and non-operational in hangars.

40. With its lack of global utility, Typhoon’s extensive modification program must be considered an unnecessary waste of Defence Budget funding: particularly in the light of the RAF’s planned procurement of the F-35. This new aircraft will be multirole and will provide all the air-to-ground capability required – provided that it is carrier-capable, i.e. the F-35B Lightning II.

Combat Operations.

41. The Typhoon is not deployable on First Echelon operations outside the NATO area. Libya and Syria deployments were Second Echelon – requiring pre-positioning and major air-bridge logistic support.

Return on investment for non-carrier-capable combat aircraft.

42. Overall Costs.

a)                  Total original investment is estimated at something more than £155 billion.

b)                  Adjusted for inflation, this figure reaches £344 billion.

c)                   Averaged annual inflation-linked expenditure from 1979 stands at £8.8 billion.

This investment has not resulted in cost-effective combat/deterrence operations offshore. All twenty-six enemy aircraft shot down by Britain’s air forces since 1948 have been at the hands of carrier-borne Naval aircraft. Surface warships have shot down a similar number.

Investment in carrier-capable Aircraft.

Sea Harrier FRS Mark1.

43. Costs.

a)                  Initial unit cost, 1979:               £12 million.

b)                  Estimated in life cost (34 aircraft):               £1.1 billion.

c)                   In-service modifications:              N/A.

Total program cost:               £1.1 billion.

44. This aircraft was procured to provide the Fleet with the ability to intercept Soviet shadowing aircraft. It was developed by the RN Fleet Air Arm into an exceptional fighter combat aircraft.

Combat Operations.

45. The aircraft distinguished itself in the Falklands war by shooting down 25 Argentinian fighters, ground attack and logistic support aircraft and by deterring attacks from over 450 Mirage V and Skyhawk strike missions.

46. It represented the difference between success and failure in the air war to retake the Falklands.

Sea Harrier FA2.

47. Costs.

a)                  Initial unit cost, 1988:               £24 million.

b)                  Estimated in life cost (56 aircraft):               £2.2 billion.

c)                   In-service modifications:              N/A.

Total program cost:               £2.2 billion.

48. This aircraft was fitted with a state-of-the-art, beyond visual range weapons system (Blue Vixen Radar and the AMRAAM missile): admired by all our NATO military partners as the most capable area interceptor within the European fighter inventory.

Combat Operations.

49. The FA2 distinguished itself with its versatility and reliability:

a)      Policing the no-fly zone over Iraq;

b)      Policing the no-fly zone over Kosovo and conducting ground attack missions when land-based aircraft were prevented from flying;

c)      Flying armed reconnaissance missions over Sierra Leone protecting UN ground forces.

50. Its untimely withdrawal from service was a significant example of misguided MoD/Air influence: removing the Fleet’s air supremacy and airspace denial capability.

Harrier GR3 through GR9.

51. Costs.

a)                  Averaged Initial unit cost, 1988:               £20 million.

b)                  Estimated in life cost (100 aircraft):               £3.6 billion.

c)                   Estimate of in-service modifications:              £500 million.

Total program cost:               £4.1 billion.

52. This outstanding ground attack and low-level reconnaissance aircraft served the nation well for almost 40 years.

Combat Operations.

53. The Harrier distinguished itself flying ground attack missions from our carriers in the Falklands war and later in Afghanistan where it represented a most in-demand close air support aircraft.

The Sea Harrier and Harrier - Return on Investment.

54. Overall Costs.

a)                  Total original investment £6 billion.

b)                  Adjusted for inflation, this figure reaches £20.4 billion. 

c)                   Averaged annual inflation-linked expenditure from 1979 - £523 million.

55. During their years in service, Sea Harriers and Harriers have accumulated significantly more combat success than the combined efforts of all their more expensive non-carrier-capable, fast jet, fixed wing counterparts.

Summary.

56. In summary,

a)                  Government investment in land-based fast jet military aircraft during the last 50 years has for the most part been inadequately justified and, in many cases, ill-considered and non-cost-effective.

b)                Carrier-capable Sea Harrier and Harrier programs have cost the taxpayer an inflation linked sum of £523 million per annum since 1979. Their combat success far outweighs the cumulative achievements of all other military fast jet aircraft in the UK inventory.

c)                 Non-carrier-capable military fixed wing aircraft have cost the nation an inflation-linked sum of £8.8 billion per annum since 1979: this has contributed significantly to the “Black Hole in Defence Spending”.

d)                  Carrier-capable aircraft have therefore demonstrated conclusively an order greater cost and operational effectiveness.

Conclusions.

57. It is concluded that

a)      Major investment in non-carrier-capable land-based fixed wing aircraft has not been justified by combat theatre achievement or by global utility.

b)      Such investment has prevented adequate, threat-related expenditure on more flexible and rapidly deployable weapons platforms in support of declared Strategic Maritime Policy including surface warships, submarines, carrier-capable aircraft and associated Strike Carrier platforms.

Recommendations.

58. It is recommended that Ministers
1. should review and justify (or otherwise) urgently the continuing major investment in land-based non-carrier-capable aircraft;
2. should revive and maintain a robust fleet and carrier-borne capability that has served us so effectively in terms of cost, deterrence and combat since the start of World War II.

59. Further, it is recommended that the Government/Defence Select Committee should now analyse and justify (or otherwise) expenditure on other generic weapon systems e.g. heavy armour and artillery – and relate this to the perceived threat and stated Strategic Maritime Policy.

19 January 2020

Annex A.  Table of investment in military Fixed Wing combat aircraft since 1967.

Table 1.  Original Costs.

See Table 2 for inflation-adjusted costs.

http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/historic-inflation-calculator

Table 2.  Inflation-linked Costs.

Annex B.  A list of successful combat operations associated with each Group of aircraft.

Land-Based Air.

Type              Combat Achievement

Tornado F1/F3.              None.

Tornado GR1/4.              Iraq – Desert Storm. Eight aircraft lost with little return.

              Kosovo.  Close Air Support of allied forces when weather permitted land-based flying.

              Libya, Afghanistan, Syria. Expensive and ineffective.

Nimrod MRA/MPA.              None.

Typhoon.              None. (Fighter Escort for Tornados in Libya and Syria was against a non-existent air threat.)

Carrier-borne Air.

Type              Combat Achievement

Sea Harrier FRS Mk1.              Falklands, 1982.

              1500 war missions/sorties flown. 98% mission availability to the Command.

              25 air-to-air kills in combat.

              Deterred/turned away over 450 Argentinian aircraft bombing missions.

Sea Harrier FA2.              Iraq. Policing the no-fly zone.

              Bosnia/Kosovo. Policing the no-fly zone and conducting air to ground missions.

              Sierra Leone. Armed reconnaissance missions in support of UN ground forces.

Harrier GR3 through GR9.              Falklands,1982.

              Up to 126 ground attack missions flown from aircraft carriers.

              Bosnia/Kosova. Several hundred missions flown from Italy.

              Afghanistan. Hundreds of highly effective Close Air Support missions flown.