Matter referred on 21 April 2022: Co-ordinated campaign of interference in the work of the Privileges Committee

• Committee of Privileges

The Special Report will be debated in the House on Monday 10 July. The motion put before the House by the Government will be amendable.

1. Why did the Committee publish a Special Report? 

This special supplementary report puts on record the Committee’s concern at the improper pressure brought to bear on the Committee and its members throughout this inquiry.

The Committee are concerned in particular at the involvement of Members of both Houses in attempting to influence the outcome of the inquiry. Those Members did not choose to engage through any proper process such as the submission of letters or evidence to our inquiry, but by attacking the members of the Committee, in order to influence their judgement. Their aim was to (1) influence the outcome of the inquiry, (2) impede the work of the Committee by inducing members to resign from it, (3) discredit the Committee’s conclusions if those conclusions were not what they wanted, and (4) discredit the Committee as a whole.

     2. Does the Special Report represent a gag on free speech inside Parliament?

Free speech is at the heart of parliamentary democracy. However, Members who, while an inquiry involving individual conduct is in progress, attack the honesty or the integrity of the Committee, or attack the process itself in a way clearly aimed at discrediting the Committee or steering the Committee towards a particular outcome, are interfering in disciplinary proceedings set up by the House in a way that is unacceptable.

The proposals in Para 20 of the report, if implemented by the House, would make explicit that the House’s existing protection for standards cases (alleged breaches of the MPs’ Code of Conduct) extends likewise to privileges cases. This would protect the House’s internal disciplinary process in a way analogous to the way the House’s sub judice resolution protects cases that are active in the courts from interference that might be prejudicial to the outcome of the case. Like the sub judice resolution, or the legal restraints on reporting court cases arising from the Contempt of Court Act 1981, this would be a strictly time-limited restriction necessary to protect the integrity of the process.

3. Is the Committee proposing a gag on free speech outside Parliament?

The special report does not refer to or criticise media commentary or actions by anyone other than Members of the Commons or Lords. The proposals in Para 20 of the report, if implemented by the House, would have no impact whatsoever on the ability of the media to report on Parliament or on the rights of free speech of members of the public. It relates only to MPs in relation to the House’s own internal disciplinary processes.

4. Members are elected to speak out, surely, they should not be prevented from speaking out against the report?

MPs have control and legitimate means of influence over any Privileges Committee inquiry. They have the right:

• to object to and vote on Members appointed to the Committee, and subsequently

to raise any alleged conflicts of interest on points of order;

• to vote against the motion of referral or to seek to amend the motion;
• to make comments on the Committee’s procedure to the Committee itself;
• to submit evidence to the Committee; and
• to debate, vote and comment publicly on the Committee’s final report once it is published and the investigation is completed.

What Members have no right to do, however, is attempt to undermine an inquiry or bring pressure to bear on the members of the Privileges Committee during the inquiry.

Members may make any points they wish in criticism of the Committee’s report when the matter is debated by the House on 10 July.

5. How can Members complain if they think the Committee’s report is unjust/ biased?

The answer to Question 4 above sets out the ways in which it is perfectly valid for Members of the House to criticise the Committee, including by submitting evidence to the Committee itself.

As an example of how it is perfectly permissible to criticise the Committee, the special report draws attention to the way that Sir William Cash criticised the Committee’s proceedings. The Committee does not accept Sir William’s criticisms, but it comments that they were made in an entirely appropriate and parliamentary manner. Sir William made his points in the debate on the referral motion, by way of an Early Day Motion, and through his contribution to the debate on the published report. He did not impugn the personal integrity of the Committee’s members or attempt to interfere inappropriately in the Committee’s internal workings.

6. Do the members of the Committee not wish to be criticised?

The answer to Question 4 above sets out the ways in which it is perfectly valid for Members of the House to criticise the Committee. This includes criticism of the Committee’s procedures or the conclusions it has drawn from the evidence.

However, the co-ordinated campaign against the Committee offended against went beyond the boundaries of what is acceptable. The “kangaroo court” allegations impugned the personal honour of Committee members by implying that they were dishonest and corrupt. The attempt to interfere with proceedings, e.g. by pressurising members to resign from the Committee, was comparable to “jury-rigging” which would not be allowed in a court case. Members of the Committee must to be allowed to proceed with their consideration of a case on the basis of the evidence before them. Like members of the Standards Committee in a Code of Conduct case, or members of a jury in a court case, they should not be subject to external lobbying, harassment, or pressure to reach a particular conclusion or to resign.

If abuse of Members who are carrying out the duties imposed on them by the House is allowed to continue, it is reasonable to conclude that in future Members would decline to serve on the Committee, or there might be a reluctance on the part of individuals approached as external advisers to serve in that role.

7. Is the Chair of the Committee prejudiced?

The Committee’s Chair is Rt Hon Harriet Harman MP. The House of Commons approved a motion to appoint Ms Harman to the Committee on the understanding that she would take the role of Chair. She was then elected as Chair unanimously by the Committee’s membership. It is convention for the Privileges Committee to be chaired by a Member of the Opposition. The Committee has a majority of Government MPs.

The special report drew attention to the statement in the House by Ms Harman that when her position as Chair was initially questioned, she received an assurance from the Government that it had confidence in her and she should proceed with the work the House had mandated. The earlier Twitter comments by Ms Harman about Mr Johnson were in the public domain before the House’s unanimous decision to appoint her to the Committee.

The exchange on the floor of the House on 19 June between Ms Harman and Sir Jacob Rees-Mogg was set out in footnote 10 to the report in order to draw attention to Ms Harman’s statement. There was no implication that it was inadmissible for Sir Jacob to raise this matter in the debate.

8. Do the precedents cited in the special report date from before it was allowable to report proceedings in the House?

It is not true that the definitions of contempt cited in the special report refer to precedents from before it was allowable to report proceedings in the House of Commons. The special report in paragraph 5 quotes from paragraph 15.14 of the current edition of Erskine May. The precedents given in the relevant footnotes to that paragraph date from a wide variety of dates of which the earliest is 1830-31, by which time the freedom to report proceedings of Parliament had been long established in practice. This criticism is therefore without merit.

9. What has the Committee recommended?

The Committee recommend that the House agree a Resolution in the following terms:

That this House:

a) notes with approval the Special Report from the Committee of Privileges;

b) considers that where the House has agreed to refer a matter relating to individual conduct to the Committee of Privileges, Members of this House should not impugn the integrity of that Committee or its members or attempt to lobby or intimidate those members or to encourage others to do so, since such behaviour undermines the proceedings of the House and is itself capable of being a contempt; and

c) considers it expedient that the House of Lords is made aware of the Special Report and this Resolution, so that that House can take such action as it deems appropriate.

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